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Abstract
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a frame-
work to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which
team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members nd
it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may in-
duce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert
guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in
which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert
nests inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs as a special case. When identical
teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric
equilibria. Equilibrium e¤ort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert,
so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity
and may underpin social norms of cooperation.
Keywords: Desert, Deservingness, Equity, Inequity aversion, Loss aversion, Reference-dependent pref-
erences, Guilt, Reciprocity, Social norms, Team production
JEL Codes: D63, J33
1 Introduction
Teams have become increasingly important in work settings in recent years (Che and Yoo, 2001,
document a number of examples). The growing popularity of teams is driven partly by the in-
creasing complexity of work tasks in a knowledge-driven environment; this increasing complexity
demands the input of many di¤erent complementary skills and makes monitoring and legally ver-
ifying the value of individual contributions more di¢ cult, thus leading to a greater use of teams
with some form of output sharing.
Equity may play an important role when agents work together in teams. In particular, a team
member may feel dissatised if the payo¤ she receives from working as part of the team deviates
from the payo¤ that she thinks she deserves. In this paper we develop a theoretical framework to
study the strategic implications of desert considerations when agents work in teams. The increasing
preponderance of teamwork makes understanding the incentives of team members more relevant
than ever. A better understanding of incentives within teams which incorporates the implications of
agentsdesert concerns will provide a more solid foundation for future research to answer broader
questions, such as: when will agents choose to join or form teams? when should employers use
teams? how should employers design optimal team compensation? can employers help foster
cooperation in teams by, e.g., providing information about the e¤orts of teammates or the e¤orts
of others in similar teams? should prot-sharing partnerships be taxed di¤erently from other types
of companies?1
Our analysis complements that of Gill and Stone (2010), who study the implications of desert
in competitive settings. We develop a meritocratic notion of desert or equity under which each
team member compares her monetary payo¤ to the payo¤ that she feels she deserves, which in turn
depends on how hard she has worked in relation to her teammates. When a team member receives
less than she feels she deserves, she su¤ers a psychological cost which we call a desert loss. It is less
clear whether she views getting more than she deserves as a good thing or a bad thing, so we allow
for both. We say that she benets from desert elation if she feels good about getting more than she
feels she deserves. When, instead, the team member feels bad about getting more than she feels
she deserves, we say that she su¤ers from desert guilt. Such feelings of guilt may be triggered by
a desire to conform with a meritocratic social norm that the distribution of payo¤s should reect
1 Our focus is on the impact of non-standard desert preferences on strategic behavior within teams under the simplest
equal sharing rule, which for example is often used by partnerships. Holmstrom (1982) and Che and Yoo (2001)
consider, in a static and dynamic context respectively, the choice of optimal sharing rule by a principal given standard
preferences. We hope this paper will spur future research on how the multiplicity of equilibria that we nd with desert
preferences interacts with a principals choice of sharing rule.
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recipientse¤orts.
Section 2 expounds our meritocratic notion of desert in more detail, relating it to the exist-
ing literature on equity and explaining how we formalize our notion using loss aversion around
endogenous reference points. A signicant body of empirical evidence from social psychology and
experimental economics supports the idea that equity and desert are important when agents exert
e¤ort. However, the literature has not embedded desert in a formal framework suitable for studying
its strategic implications.
Section 3 presents the formal model, which we apply in Section 4 to analyze the implications
of desert for equilibrium e¤ort choices in teams. When identical teammates share the team output
equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria: some of these equilibria generate
more e¤ort than without desert; but, more surprisingly, other equilibria generate less e¤ort than
when desert considerations are absent. Desert guilt forges an endogenous complementarity between
agents e¤orts by giving the agents incentives to match the e¤orts of their teammates, and so
generates behavior that is consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity. However, as
outlined in Section 4.2, the mechanism which introduces reciprocity into our framework is di¤erent
to that which drives intentions-based theories of reciprocal altruism. When desert guilt leads to
cooperative behavior, the guilt can be thought of as underlying social norms of cooperation: desert
guilt can make cooperation normatively appropriate for an agent, conditional on her teammates
adhering to the norm of cooperative behavior. Thus desert guilt, which as noted above may itself
be underpinned by a meritocratic social norm, can give rise to a specic norm of cooperation in
our team setting. With desert elation, e¤ort is always driven below the no-desert level as the team
members feel no compunction about taking advantage of their teammates by slacking o¤. We also
study the welfare implications of desert in Section 4.4.
The theoretical implications of desert in team settings in which e¤ort creates a positive ex-
ternality for teammates are very di¤erent to those when agents compete and so impose negative
externalities on rivals. As noted above, Gill and Stone (2010) consider the implications of desert in
a competitive environment, nding that when agents compete desert concerns push identical agents
to di¤erentiate their e¤ort levels, with some agents working very hard and others slacking o¤ sub-
stantially. Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2010) provide support for this prediction using evidence from a
laboratory experiment. The fact that desert concerns imply such di¤erent predictions across these
di¤erent settings is evidence of the scope and portability of our notion of desert. Desert concerns
may inuence behavior in any situation in which agents exert e¤ort, and an agents payo¤ depends
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on her own e¤ort as well as on the e¤orts of some other agents that she interacts with.
Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situations
in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is perceived to be fair or equitable. Desert-
concerned agents care not just about the distribution of monetary payo¤s, but also on how the
distribution came about. Indeed, our conception of desert is related to the inequity-aversion model
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and one of the aims of our paper is to clarify this relationship. In
Section 5, we show that in a team setting our model of desert nests Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-type
inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs as a special case. Inequity aversion over
money net of e¤ort costs implies one particular way to weight monetary payo¤s in relation to e¤ort
exerted, while our notion of desert does not prescribe the exact form that this weighting should
take.
Finally, in Section 6 we study a simple linearized example which allows the calculation of explicit
analytical expressions for the range of possible equilibria. We hope that this example will prove
useful in future applied theoretical and empirical work. Section 7 concludes.
2 Desert in teams
We start by outlining our general notion of desert and linking it to the existing literature. Suppose
that a set of identical agents are members of a team: the agents exert costly e¤ort to help produce
some team output which is shared equally among the team members. Output sharing implies that
each agents e¤ort confers a positive externality on her teammates. We capture a notion of desert
or equity by supposing that each agent cares about how her monetary payo¤ compares to how much
she feels she deserves, given by a reference point ri which depends on how hard agent i has worked
relative to her teammates. We also suppose that the agents share a common notion of desert, so
they agree about the payo¤ each deserves. Our notion of desert is meritocratic: if an agent works
harder than a teammate, she feels she deserves more than that teammate, while if she works less
hard she feels she deserves less. Letting ei represent agent i0s e¤ort:
ri T rj , ei T ej : (1)
Gill and Stone (2010) consider a similar notion of desert, but in a competitive context where
e¤orts impose a negative externality on rivals and an agents deserved reference point is given by
her expected winnings. We suppose that desert-motivated agents feel hard done by when they
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receive less than what they feel they deserve, while feelings of elation or guilt are possible when
they do better than they deserve. We operationalize our notion of desert by assuming that each
agent is loss averse around her reference point, so losses relative to the deserved reference point are
more painful than gains are pleasurable; indeed, doing better than is felt to be deserved may induce
psychologically painful guilt rather than elation. Loss aversion captures the central stylized fact
that has emerged from the empirical literature on reference-dependent preferences: losses relative
to reference points loom larger than corresponding gains (see Rabin, 1998, and DellaVigna, 2009,
for surveys, and the original paper by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the terminology of K½oszegi
and Rabin (2007), the reference points in our set-up are choice-acclimating and thus endogenous:
the agents understand and anticipate how their e¤ort choices inuence their reference points. In a
competitive tournament setting, Gill and Prowse (forthcoming) nd experimental evidence of the
importance of loss aversion around choice-acclimating reference points.2
As a rst step, we focus on modeling the desert concerns of identical agents, who are thus of
equal ability. If agents di¤ered in their cost of e¤ort functions, but team output continued to depend
on e¤ort, a meritocratic notion of desert would imply only that the reference point that an agent
feels she deserves be increasing in her own e¤ort, holding constant the e¤orts of her teammates.
The specic requirement given by (1) would then correspond to a libertarian(Cappelen et al.,
2007) assumption about deservingness, in which desert depends only on individual output (here
measured by e¤ort) and is independent of inputs or ability. A liberal egalitarian(Cappelen et al.,
2007) assumption would instead allocate deservingness according to agentsinputs, as measured by
the cost of exerted e¤ort.
Although little theoretical work has been carried out to model desert concerns formally,3 a
signicant body of literature supports the idea that people are motivated by a meritocratic notion
of desert. Rabin (1998) writes that desert will obviously be relevant in many situations - and the
massive psychological literature on equity theoryshows that people feel that those who have put
more e¤ort into creating resources have more claim on those resources (p. 18). Adams (1965)
was the rst modern proponent of equity theory: his work in social psychology led him to conclude
that when [a person] nds that his outcomes and inputs are not in balance in relation to those of
others, feelings of inequity result(p. 280) and that there can be little doubt that inequity results
2 Daido and Murooka (2011) show that when workers are loss averse around choice-acclimating expectations, to mitigate
wage uncertainty a principal might choose to use a teamcontract under which one workers pay increases in the
performance of another.
3 An exception is Konow (2000), who considers only the optimal division of output by a dictator for given e¤ort choices.
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) invoke equity considerations to motivate an e¤ort-supply function that is sensitive to the
wage an agent receives relative to the wage she believes to be fair.
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in dissatisfaction, in an unpleasant emotional state, be it anger or guilt (p. 283). Using survey
data, Konow (1996) distills an accountability principle according to which a persons entitlement
varies in direct proportion to the value of his relevant discretionary variables, relative to others (p.
19). Experimental evidence also backs up the idea that people are sensitive to considerations of
desert. For example, Konow (2000), Frohlich et al. (2004) and Cappelen et al. (2007) nd evidence
that when the amount to be distributed reects agentse¤orts, dictators tend to award a higher
payo¤ to agents who have exerted more e¤ort, while Abeler et al. (2010) show that when norms
of equity are violated, so harder working agents are paid the same as those who exert less e¤ort,
the hard working agents start to withdraw e¤ort even though it is in their interest to continue to
work hard in the absence of social preferences. Finally, in an experimental setting with di¤erent
productivities, Gantner et al. (2001) classify subjects according to their equity standards.
3 Formal model
We now imbed our notion of desert described above in Section 2 into a formal model.
3.1 Team production game
N  2 identical agents simultaneously choose e¤ort ei  0 at cost C (ei) ; with C(0) = C 0(0) = 0;
C 0 > 0 for ei > 0; C 00 > 0 and C 0 unbounded above. Team output Y depends on the sum of
the agentse¤orts, so Y = f
PN
i=1 ei

; with f(0) = 0; f 0 > 0 and f 00  0: The team output is
distributed equally, so each agent receives a monetary payo¤ yi = Y=N which the agent values at
 (yi) with  (0) = 0; 0 > 0 and 00  0:4 The agents can only produce as part of the team and
not individually (perhaps because access to a crucial means of production is tied to the team).
In the absence of desert preferences, to be introduced shortly, each agent has a twice continuously
di¤erentiable utility function U i (ei; e i) =  (yi) C (ei) ; which depends on the agents own e¤ort
ei and the vector of e¤orts chosen by the other team members e i. We call U i agent i0s standard
utility.
3.2 Desert preferences
As explained in Section 2, we capture agentsdesert concerns by supposing that each agent cares
not only about her monetary payo¤ and e¤ort cost, but also about how the monetary payo¤ yi
4 It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case where each individuals output is partially or fully non-rival
in consumption. Each team member then receives yi = aYN =
af
N
; where a ranges from 1 to N as we move from full
rivalry to full non-rivalry, so we can simply replace f by af throughout.
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compares to a reference point ri that represents the payo¤ that the agent feels she deserves. We
suppose that each agents endogenous reference point is given by ri (ei; e i) ; which is continuously
di¤erentiable when
PN
i=1 ei > 0 and, letting r
0
i  @ri=@ei and letting z i represent a common level
of e¤ort ej = z 8j 6= i, satises the following assumption:
Assumption 1 If ej = z > 0 8j 6= i then (i) ei T z ) ri (ei; z i) T f(ei+(N 1)z))N and (ii)
r0i (z; z i) >
f 0(Nz)
N :
Part (i) says that the identical agents adopt a meritocratic notion of desert such that if all
agents put in a common level of e¤ort z, each agent feels she deserves an equal N th share of the
resulting team output, while if agent i exerts more (less) e¤ort than the common level of the other
team members, she feels she deserves more (less) than the equal N th share yi that she receives.
Part (i) follows from our general notion of desert (1) if we assume that
PN
i=1 ri = Y; so the amounts
felt to be deserved sum to the team output available for distribution. Part (ii) says that, starting
from a common e¤ort level z; the payo¤ that agent i feels she deserves increases faster in her own
e¤ort ei than does her actual payo¤, which is equivalent to saying that the share of team output
felt to be deserved is strictly increasing.5 Part (ii) follows from part (i) in non-pathological cases.6
Each agents utility Ui is assumed to take the following separable form:
Ui (ei; e i) =  (yi) +D ( (yi)   (ri))  C (ei) = U i (ei; e i) +D ( (yi)   (ri)) ; (2)
where desert utility D ( (yi)   (ri)) represents the reference-dependent utility that the agent
experiences from comparing her monetary payo¤ to her reference point. Desert utility depends on
4i  (yi)   (ri); that is on the di¤erence between the material utility derived from the agents
share of output and the material utility associated with receiving the deserved reference point. It
is important to emphasize that in this formulation an agents reference point is choice-acclimating
and hence endogenous: as the agent changes her e¤ort choice, her reference point adjusts, and the
agent anticipates this when deciding how hard to work.
We let desert utility D (4i) be a continuous function with D (4i) = L (4i) when 4i < 0;
D (4i) = 0 when 4i = 0 and D (4i) = G (4i) when 4i > 0: Since 0 > 0, 4i T 0 ,  (yi) T
 (ri) , yi T ri. Thus, L (4i) represents the desert utility associated with situations in which
5 The share felt to be deserved is given by ri
f
and the derivative of this share with respect to ei is given by
r0if rif 0
f2
:
At a common e¤ort level z > 0; ri
f
= 1
N
; so this derivative is strictly positive if and only if (ii) holds.
6 Part (i) implies that ri (ei; z i) crosses
f(ei+(N 1)z)
N
from below at ei = z; so r0i (z; z i)  f
0(Nz))
N
; with strict inequality
in non-pathological cases.
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yi < ri where the agent receives less than she feels she deserves. In that case we say that the agent
su¤ers a desert loss, and we assume that L (4i) < 0, so such losses are always unambiguously
painful. G (4i) represents the desert utility when yi > ri; so the agent receives more than she
feels she deserves. When G (4i) > 0; we say the agent derives desert elation from 4i > 0: she
gains pleasure from doing better than deserved; when G (4i) < 0 we say the agent su¤ers desert
guilt from 4i > 0: doing better than is felt to be deserved induces a psychological cost which we
call guilt.7 Letting G0(0)  lim4i#0G0 (4i) ; we dene local and global desert guilt and elation as
follows:
Denition 1 The agents exhibit local desert guilt if G0(0) < 0: They exhibit global desert guilt if
G0(0) < 0 and G (4i) < 0 for all 4i > 0:
Denition 2 The agents exhibit local desert elation if G0(0) > 0: They exhibit global desert elation
if G0(0) > 0 and G (4i) > 0 for all 4i > 0:
As discussed in Section 2, we assume that each agent is loss averse around her choice-acclimating
endogenous reference point. In particular, letting L0(0)  lim4i"0 L0 (4i) ; we assume that desert
utilityD(4i) is di¤erentiable everywhere away from4i = 0; that L0(0) > 0; and that L0(0) > G0(0).
Thus, in the limit as the deviation from the reference point tends to zero, desert losses remain
painful and desert losses are more painful than any desert elation is pleasurable: the agents are loss
averse for small stakes. This corresponds to Assumption A4 in K½oszegi and Rabins (2006) formal
description of loss aversion, and implies a kink in utility at the reference point.8 Models of loss
aversion generally also assume loss aversion for large stakes, weak convexity in the loss domain and
weak concavity in the gain domain (Assumptions A2 and A3 in K½oszegi and Rabin, 2006), but our
results do not require such assumptions.
7 We take the classical view of guilt as arising from private feelings associated with a troubled conscience (Smith
et al., 2002, p. 138). However, nothing in the structure of our model precludes a role for other negative emotions
linked to publicity such as shame which involves an unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or
presumed negative judgment of himself by others (Ausubel, 1955, p. 382). Note also that desert guilt di¤ers from
the guilt aversion of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), who use dynamic psychological game theory to model guilt
from reducing another agents payo¤ below her expectations. In our model, an agent can feel guilt even when others
expectations are conrmed.
8 Note that in K½oszegi and Rabins (2006) formalization, L0(0) > G0(0) > 0; so that in the limit receiving less than
the reference point is always painful but receiving more is always pleasurable. In our desert framework, we allow
G0(0) < 0 to capture desert guilt.
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3.3 Examples
To x ideas, we now provide a few concrete examples of desert preferences which satisfy the as-
sumptions outlined above. We start by presenting three plausible forms for the reference point. All
three satisfy Assumption 1 and our general notion of desert (1). First, an agent could feel that she
deserves a share of team output equal to her share of e¤ort, so:
ri =
eiPN
i=1
ei
f
PN
i=1 ei

when
PN
i=1 ei > 0: (3)
Second, the agent might feel that she deserves a share of team output equal to her share of the cost
of e¤ort, so:
ri =
C(ei)PN
i=1
C(ei)
f
PN
i=1 ei

when
PN
i=1 ei > 0 so
PN
i=1C (ei) > 0: (4)
Finally, the agent could feel that she deserves an equal share of the team output that would have
been produced had everybody worked as hard as she did, so:
ri =
f(Nei)
N
: (5)
Next, we present one simple piecewise-linear form for desert utility D (4i) which satises our
assumptions on desert utility outlined above. We present this example for illustrative purposes
piecewise linearity is not required for our equilibrium results in Section 4. With piecewise linearity,
D (4i) = L (4i) = l4i when 4i < 0; D (4i) = 0 when 4i = 0 and D (4i) = G (4i) = g4i when
4i > 0; thus l represents the slope of desert utility when the agent receives less than she feels she
deserves and g represents the slope when the agent receives more. To ensure that an agent su¤ers a
desert loss when she receives less than she feels she deserves, i.e., L (4i) < 0; we assume that l > 0:
Desert guilt (Denition 1) implies that g < 0 while desert elation (Denition 2) implies that g > 0:
Note that with piecewise linearity there is no longer a distinction between local and global desert
guilt or between local and global desert elation, and our assumption of loss aversion boils down to
assuming that l > g: Applications of loss aversion often use a piecewise-linear functional form (for
some recent examples see Crawford and Meng, forthcoming, and Gill and Prowse, forthcoming); in
particular, Gill and Stones (2010) analysis of desert in competitive environments assumes piecewise
linearity throughout.
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3.4 Desert equilibrium
Taking the e¤orts of her teammates e i as given, each agent chooses her own e¤ort ei to maximize
her utility Ui. Having exerted her chosen e¤ort, each agent receives her monetary payo¤ and also
observes the e¤ort levels of her teammates. Observability implies that the agents do not have to
try to infer other agentse¤orts from the team output. When an agents reference point ri depends
only on her own e¤ort ei and the sum of her teammatese¤orts
P
j 6=i ej , as will be the case in
the linear example of Section 6, the assumption of observability is superuous as
P
j 6=i ej can be
inferred perfectly from the agents monetary payo¤ yi: We restrict attention to pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, which we call desert equilibria.9
4 Equilibrium analysis
4.1 No desert
As a benchmark, we rst solve for equilibrium play when the agents do not have desert preferences.
The equilibrium is symmetric and interior. Dening social welfare as the sum of utilities, so welfare
W  PNi=1 Ui; e¤ort in the unique equilibrium is socially too low due to the positive externality
inherent in the team production game.
Proposition 1 In the absence of desert, there is a unique and symmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium in which the agents exert strictly positive e¤ort e: Equilibrium e¤ort is strictly lower than
the socially optimal e¤ort level ew:
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Desert guilt
When agents su¤er from global desert guilt (see Denition 1), so the agents always dislike receiving
more than they feel they deserve, desert generates a range of symmetric equilibria around the
no-desert equilibrium e as Proposition 2 illustrates.
9 Technically, our game is psychological (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) as agent i0s utility depends on her belief about the
e¤orts of her teammates via the reference point. In particular, our game falls under Battigalli and Dufwenbergs
(2009) framework of a dynamic psychological game as utility depends on terminal node (ex post) beliefs, so beliefs
can update during the course of the game (in contrast to Geanakoplos et al., in which utilities only depend on initial
beliefs). However, we have assumed that the agents observe each others e¤orts ex post, so the actual e¤orts pin down
these beliefs at the terminal nodes. Thus we do not need to introduce the apparatus of psychological games: we can
write payo¤s as a function of actions alone, given the actions determine the rst-order beliefs. Even in the absence
of observability, the set of pure-strategy equilibria would remain the same: the discussion in the third-from-last
paragraph of Section 2 in Gill and Stone (2010) also applies here.
9
Proposition 2 When the agents exhibit global desert guilt, a range of symmetric desert equilibria
exists around the equilibrium level of e¤ort in the absence of desert e; with some equilibria strictly
above and some strictly below e:
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. If an agent increases her work e¤ort above the common e¤ort level
of her teammates, she raises the reference point that she feels she deserves above the equal share
of the team output that she receives. Thus she su¤ers a desert loss as she receives less than she
feels she deserves. If, instead, the agent reduces her work e¤ort below that of her teammates, she
su¤ers from desert guilt as her deserved reference point falls below an equal share of team output,
and so she receives more than she feels she deserves. Thus, starting from a common e¤ort level,
desert considerations reduce both the incentive to increase and to decrease e¤ort. When the com-
mon e¤ort level is not too far from the no-desert equilibrium, these desert considerations dominate,
thus generating a symmetric equilibrium. Essentially, desert forges an endogenous complementar-
ity between agentse¤orts by giving them incentives to match the e¤orts of their teammates in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 tells us that, perhaps unsurprisingly, desert guilt can make the agents work harder
in equilibrium.10 Thus desert guilt, which as noted in the Introduction may itself be underpinned
by a desire to conform to a meritocratic social norm, can give rise to a specic social norm of coop-
eration in our team production setting: desert guilt can make cooperation normatively appropriate
for an agent, conditional on her teammates adhering to the norm of cooperative behavior. Once a
norm of cooperation starts to become established, desert guilt can help to ensure that the agents
stick to the norm without the need for any external pressure or sanctions. In practice, however, we
might expect desert guilt to interact with external enforcement mechanisms such as public shame
and punishment in forming and underpinning social norms of cooperation.11 The importance of
social norms suggests that employers using teams might try to mold perceptions of norms by, for
instance, providing team members with information about e¤ort levels in other similar successful
teams.
10Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Mohnen et al. (2008) study the e¤ect of peer pressure on e¤ort in a team production
setting. Kandel and Lazear assume that peer pressure operates linearly, and so raises e¤ort in the unique symmetric
equilibrium. Mohnen et al. assume that the peer pressure function is convex, and so has no e¤ect on equilibrium
e¤ort in a single-stage game.
11 See Young (1998), Bicchieri (2006) and Krupka and Weber (2009) for further discussion and experimental evidence
of the role of social norms and the importance of context and expectations in how norms drive behavior.
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More unexpectedly, with desert guilt there is a whole range of possible symmetric equilibria,
some of which involve less e¤ort than in the absence of desert considerations. Our theory of desert
thus endogenously generates behavior that is consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity,
whereby agents reciprocate by matching the level of cooperation of their teammates.
A number of experiments provide evidence that a large proportion of subjects in contribution
games exhibit conditionally cooperative behavior. In linear public good games, Fischbacher et al.
(2001), Croson (2007), and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit contribution schedules, nding
that a majority of subjects show a positive relationship between desired contribution levels and the
group average, while Falk et al. (forthcoming) nd that the same individual contributes more to
a public good when he is a member of a group with higher average contributions. In these types
of linear public good experiments, contributions are monetary and tend to fall over time towards
the selsh Nash equilibrium. However, with real e¤ort in a team production setting van Dijk et
al. (2001) nd no free-riding on average, with no tendency for the average amount of free-riding
to increase over time. We would expect deservingness to be more salient when subjects exert real
e¤ort; thus in an environment with real e¤ort desert-type considerations should be better able
to sustain cooperative behavior over time. In non-linear public good experiments (with interior
selsh Nash equilibria) average contributions sometimes fall below the selsh Nash equilibrium
level, suggesting negative reciprocity (see Isaac and Walker, 1998, Cason et al., 2002, 2004, and the
survey by Laury and Holt, 2008).
We stress, however, that the mechanism which introduces reciprocity into our framework is
di¤erent to that which drives intentions-based theories of reciprocal altruism. Intentions-based
models explain conditional cooperation by assuming that agents like to reciprocate kindness by
helping those who are kind to them but hurting those who are mean to them (see for instance
Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, and Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). The perceived
kindness of an action is determined by the perceived intention of the agent, which introduces
hierarchies of beliefs into utility. In contrast, our theory of desert predicts reciprocal behavior
without the need to introduce beliefs about motives or intentions of other agents.12
12 Some authors impose reciprocity by simply assuming that certain actions induce a reciprocal response without any
consideration of intentions, which of course can give rise to multiple equilibria. In various team production-type
settings Sugden (1984), Rob and Zemsky (2002) and Huck et al. (2010) impose positive reciprocity, Sugden by
assuming that at a minimum agents want to match the lowest of their rivalse¤orts, Rob and Zemsky by assuming
that the greater the degree of cooperation in the previous period, the more employees want to cooperate now, and
Huck et al. by assuming that the strength of a preference for conforming to a social norm is increasing in the degree
of conformity of the other players.
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4.3 Desert elation
When agents exhibit local desert elation (see Denition 2), so the agents actively like receiving
slightly more than they feel they deserve, Proposition 3 shows that e¤ort in a symmetric equilibrium
must decline compared to the case where the agents do not have desert preferences.
Proposition 3 When agents exhibit local desert elation, e¤ort in any symmetric desert equilibrium
is strictly lower than the equilibrium level of e¤ort in the absence of desert e.
Proof. See Appendix.
Local desert elation implies that, starting from a common level of e¤ort, the local incentive to
reduce e¤ort is now higher than in the absence of desert considerations. Agents like receiving more
than they feel they deserve, and by reducing e¤ort an agent lowers her deserved reference point
below the equal share of team output that she receives. Thus no common e¤ort level at or above
the no-desert equilibrium e can form a symmetric equilibrium, as the agents would want to slack o¤
to enjoy some desert elation. The linear example in Section 6 illustrates that a range of symmetric
equilibria may exist below e: In this range, the common e¤ort level is low enough that the desert
elation from deviating to an even lower level of e¤ort is outweighed by the reduction in standard
utility U i:
4.4 Welfare
Remember that we dened social welfare as the sum of utilities, so W =
PN
i=1 Ui.
13 Part (i) of the
following proposition tells us that desert guilt does not change how hard the agents should work
in order to maximize welfare. Part (ii) tells us that desert guilt can raise welfare relative to the
no-desert level if it partially or wholly overcomes the free-rider problem in the team production
game by pushing the agents to match the higher e¤ort levels of their teammates, but that desert
guilt can also lower welfare if it lowers e¤ort (see Proposition 2 which shows that desert guilt can
either raise or lower e¤orts in equilibrium). The nal part of the result tells us that, by lowering
e¤orts, desert elation reduces welfare relative to the no-desert level.
13 If desert concerns are understood as a moral judgment about what an agent feels she ought to do rather than as
a component of her well-being, welfare should exclude desert utility. Of course this distinction has no e¤ect on
behavior, and since we focus on symmetric equilibria in which desert utility is zero in equilibrium, the distinction is
not important for the results in this section.
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Proposition 4
(i) If the agents exhibit global desert guilt, the socially optimal level of e¤ort remains the same
as in the absence of desert preferences.
(ii) Assuming the agents play a symmetric desert equilibrium, global desert guilt increases wel-
fare if it raises e¤ort towards the socially optimal level, but reduces welfare if it lowers e¤ort below
the level in the absence of desert preferences.
(iii) Assuming the agents play a symmetric desert equilibrium with strictly positive e¤ort, local
desert elation always reduces welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
Desert guilt can raise welfare despite the negative psychological consequences of receiving more
or less than is felt to be deserved. This is because when all the agents work equally hard, everybody
feels that they deserve the equal share of team output that they receive, and so desert utility is zero.
This raises the possibility that desert guilt evolved to coordinate behavior on welfare-improving
e¤ort choices. We note, however, that desert guilt can push the agents to work too hard if e¤ort
is raised above the socially optimal level, and it is even possible for desert guilt to push e¤ort so
high that welfare falls below the level in the no-desert benchmark.
5 Inequity aversion as a special case of desert
Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situations in
which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is perceived to be fair or equitable. Desert-concerned
agents care not just about the distribution of monetary payo¤s, but also on how the distribution
came about. Indeed, our notion of desert is related to the inequity-aversion models of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and one of the aims of this paper is to clarify
this relationship in a team production setting. Inequity-averse agents, like desert-concerned agents,
care about the distribution of resources in addition to their own material payo¤s. Inequity aversion
over monetary payo¤s alone plays no role in our team production setting because all the agents
receive the same equal share of the team output. Desert-concerned agents, on the other hand, care
about the relationship between the distribution of monetary payo¤s and the distribution of agents
e¤orts, and not just about the brute distribution of money. However, agents might be inequity
averse over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs, in which case they too will be concerned with the
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relationship between money and e¤ort.14
In fact, it turns out that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort
costs is a special case of our more general notion of desert: we show below that inequity aversion
over money net of e¤ort costs corresponds to a particular form of the reference point that is
felt to be deserved, while our theory of desert leaves open the form of the functional relationship
between e¤orts and deservingness. Also, for analytical tractability Fehr and Schmidt (1999) impose
piecewise-linear loss aversion, while our theory allows desert utility to take on arbitrary non-linear
shapes around the kink implied by loss aversion.
If we apply Fehr and Schmidts (1999) model of inequity aversion (equation (1) at p. 822) to
our team production game, and assume aversion to di¤erences in monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort
costs, then:
Ui (ei; e i) = yi   C(ei)  N 1
X
j 6=i
max fC(ei)  C(ej); 0g   N 1
X
j 6=i
max fC(ej)  C(ei); 0g ; (6)
where   ,  > 0 and  2 [0; 1) :15 Note that monetary payo¤s drop out of the comparison terms
because yi = yj = f
PN
i=1 ei

=N for all i; j pairs.
With just two agents, it is straightforward to see that (6) is a special case of our model of desert.
The reference point that agent i feels she deserves is then given by:
ri (ei; e i) =
f
PN
i=1 ei

N
+ C(ei)  C(ej); (7)
which satises Assumption 1 and our general notion of desert (1). Money utility is linear, so
 (yi) = yi: Desert utility D (4i) takes the piecewise-linear form outlined in the second paragraph
of Section 3.3, with l = , g =   and 4i = yi   ri = C(ej)   C(ei): The assumption of loss
aversion, i.e., that l > g; corresponds to  >   which always holds in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
given  > 0 and   0: Thus we have the following result.
14 A few papers analyze the consequences of inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs. Demougin and
Fluet (2003) evaluate the impact in tournaments, Kölle et al. (2011) study the impact on contributions to a public
good (focusing on the role of initial wealth di¤erences, they nd that a continuum of equilibria may exist), and a
burgeoning literature looks at the implications for contract design (Itoh, 2004, Demougin and Fluet, 2006, Demougin
et al., 2006, Desiraju and Sappington, 2007, Rey Biel, 2008, Bartling and von Siemens, 2010, Bartling, forthcoming,
von Siemens, forthcoming a, forthcoming, b).
15 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do not explicitly require that  > 0; but when  = 0;  =  = 0, so the inequity terms
disappear and their model collapses to the standard one.
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Proposition 5 When there are two agents, our model of desert nests inequity aversion over mon-
etary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs as a special case.
When the aversion to advantageous inequity is strict, i.e.,  > 0; the agents exhibit global desert
guilt (Denition 1) as G0(0) =   < 0 and G (4i) =  4i < 0 for all 4i > 0: Thus Proposition
2 applies. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do not allow agents to like advantageous inequity, i.e., they
exclude the case where  < 0: Nonetheless, we also consider this case. When  < 0; the agents
exhibit local desert elation (Denition 2) as G0(0) =   > 0. Thus Proposition 3 applies, so long
as we maintain the assumption of loss aversion so  >  :
When there are more than two agents, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, outlined above in
(6), involves a series of pairwise comparisons. To see the connection between inequity aversion over
money net of e¤ort costs and our model of desert, we therefore need to broaden our model of desert
to also allow for pairwise desert comparisons.
Let q (ei; ej ; e ij) represent how much more or less agent i fells that she deserves relative to
agent j; where e ij represents the vector of e¤ort choices of all the other agents: In order to satisfy
our general notion of desert (1), which says that agent i feels she deserves more (less) than agent
j if and only if she works harder (less hard), we impose that:
q (ei; ej ; e ij) T 0, ei T ej : (8)
Letting 4ij   q (ei; ej ; e ij) ; the desert utility component of total utility Ui now takes the fol-
lowing form:
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
D (4ij) ; (9)
where the properties of D (4ij) match those previously imposed on D (4i) in Section 3.2. Thus
a given pairwise comparison induces a desert loss when agent i feels she deserves more than agent
j so q (ei; ej ; e ij) > 0 and hence 4ij < 0; and induces desert elation or guilt when i feels she
deserves less than j so q (ei; ej ; e ij) < 0 and hence 4ij > 0: This generalization nests our earlier
model of desert when we set q (ei; ej ; e ij) =   ((yi)  (ri)), so 4ij = 4i = (yi)   (ri) for
all i; j pairs, and hence desert utility
P
j 6=iD (4ij)

= (N   1) = D (4i) = D ((yi)  (ri)).16
The generalization also nests inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs, given by (6), when
 (yi) = yi; q (ei; ej ; e ij) = C(ei)   C(ej) so 4ij = C(ej)   C(ei); and D (4ij) takes the same
16Of course, q (ei; ej ; e ij) can then no longer be interpreted directly in terms of relative desert as we no longer have
any notion of pairwise comparisons, and so we should not seek to impose (8).
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piecewise-linear form as D (4i) in the two-agent case above with l = , g =  , and l > g as
 >  . Thus we get the following result.
Proposition 6 When there are more than two agents, a generalization of our model of desert to
allow for pairwise desert comparisons continues to nest inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s
net of e¤ort costs as a special case.
Our model of desert focuses on the case where agents are identical. As discussed in Section 2, if
the agents di¤ered in their ability as measured by their cost of e¤ort functions, then requirement (1)
would correspond to a libertarianassumption about deservingness in which desert depends only on
individual outputs and is independent of ability. The deserved reference point implied by inequity
aversion over money net of e¤ort costs (7) would instead correspond to a liberal egalitarianism
assumption (Cappelen et al., 2007) about deservingness, where agents who incur higher e¤ort costs
are more deserving. The deserved reference point based on e¤ort cost shares given by (4) would
provide another example of liberal egalitarianism.
6 Linear example
In this section we linearize our model in order to work with an analytically tractable example.
We undertake this exercise for a number of reasons. First, the analysis claries the more abstract
results above in an applied setting. Second, we can say more in the example: in particular we can
rule out asymmetric desert equilibria and we nd a range of equilibria with desert elation. Third,
the example allows us to get a feel for how the range of equilibria varies with the parameters of
the model. Finally, we hope that the example will prove useful in future applied theoretical and
empirical work.
We linearize money utility, so (yi) = yi; and we linearize team output as a function of e¤orts, so
f
PN
i=1 ei

=
PN
i=1 ei:We assume that the cost of e¤ort function is quadratic, i.e., C(ei) =
 
ce2i

=2
with c > 0, so marginal cost is linearized. We further assume that the deserved reference point
takes the form given by (5), which gives ri = ei due to the linearity of the team output function
f (note that (3) would give also give ri = ei): Finally, we assume that desert utility D (4i) takes
the piecewise-linear form described in the second paragraph of Section 3.3, so l > 0 represents the
slope of desert utility when the agent receives less than she feels she deserves and g represents the
slope when the agent receives more. Our assumption of loss aversion implies that l > g: As noted
in Section 3.3, under piecewise-linearity there is no distinction between local and global desert guilt
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or between local and global desert elation, so we will simply refer to desert guilt when g < 0 and
desert elation when g > 0: Under these conditions, we get the following result.
Proposition 7
(i) In the absence of desert, there is a unique and symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
which the agents exert e¤ort e = 1cN > 0; which is strictly lower than the socially e¢ cient level
ew = 1c :
(ii) With desert, any e¤ort e 2  1cN   l  N 1cN  ; max 1cN   g  N 1cN  ; 0	 \ R+ forms a sym-
metric desert equilibrium. There are no other desert equilibria.
(iii) Desert guilt (g < 0) gives a range of symmetric desert equilibria around the equilibrium
level of e¤ort in the absence of desert e: The top of the range tends to the socially e¢ cient level of
e¤ort ew as g tends to  1:
(iv) Desert elation (g > 0) implies that equilibrium e¤ort is always strictly lower than the level
in the absence of desert e, with a range of symmetric desert equilibria when g < 1N 1 and a unique
symmetric desert equilibrium at zero e¤ort when g  1N 1 :
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (i) corresponds to Proposition 1 for the more general model. Part (ii) gives us the range
of symmetric equilibria with desert as an explicit function of the parameters of the linear example.
Part (ii) also tells us that in this linear example there can be no asymmetric equilibria - we were
not able to rule these out in our more general model. Part (iii) conrms Proposition 2, but further
tells us that as g tends to  1; so desert utility with guilt tends to be as steep as money utility,
we approach social e¢ ciency if the agents coordinate on the highest e¤ort equilibrium. Part (iv)
conrms Proposition 3, but also tells us that a range of equilibria exists when the desert elation is
not too strong.
We now look at how the range of equilibria given by part (ii) changes with the strength of
desert preferences. When desert elation becomes weaker or desert guilt becomes stronger (i.e., g
falls), the highest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort goes up. When desert losses become more
strongly felt (i.e., l rises), the lowest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort goes down. With desert
guilt (g < 0); the di¤erence between the highest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort and the no-desert
level as a proportion of the no-desert level e= (cN) 1 is given by  g (N   1) > 0: this proportion
is increasing in the strength of desert guilt and in the number of agents N:
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a theoretical framework to study the strategic implications of desert
considerations when agents work in teams. Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization
of distributional concern models to situations in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is
perceived to be fair or equitable. We focused on the strategic implications of desert for the team
members themselves. However, we hope that our framework and insights will provide a useful
building block for future research drawing out the wider implications of desert concerns, e.g., for
employers deciding whether to use teams in the workplace and designing optimal team incentive
schemes, for policy-makers deciding how to tax partnerships and team-based bonuses, and for
workers themselves deciding whether or not to join teams. We also hope that our model will spur
testing to determine whether agents who interact in teams behave as if desert concerns matter
to them. Finally, we hope that researchers will use our framework to analyze the equilibrium
implications of desert in broader settings where, for instance, teammates interact repeatedly, or
simultaneously cooperate in teams but compete for promotions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For any vector of e¤orts e i for the other team members:
U
0
i 
@U i
@ei
= 0

f
N

f 0
N
  C 0; (10)
U
00
i 
@2U i
@e2i
= 00

f
N

f 0
N
2
+ 0

f
N

f 00
N
  C 00 < 0: (11)
Thus for any e i; U i is strictly concave; and furthermore U
0
i < 0 for high enough ei given C
0 is
unbounded above. Therefore a strict best response ei exists and is unique for any e i.
No asymmetric equilibrium can exist. Suppose one did. The agent(s) with the highest e¤ort
must have U
0
i = 0: Any agent with a strictly lower e¤ort will share the same 
0

f
N

f 0
N and have a
strictly lower C 0 and so will have a strict incentive to increase e¤ort.
Di¤erentiating U
0
i w.r.t. a common e¤ort level z:
@U
0
i
@z
= 00

f (Nz)
N

f 0 (Nz)
N
2
N + 0

f (Nz)
N

f 00 (Nz)
N
N   C 00(z) < 0: (12)
Thus a unique symmetric equilibrium e > 0 exists where e = C 0 1 0 f(Ne)N  f 0(Ne)N  as U 0i > 0
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for z = 0 while U
0
i < 0 for high enough z given C
0 is unbounded above.
Consider now the socially optimal vector of e¤orts. Because C 00 > 0 and Y depends on
PN
i=1 ei,
all the agentse¤orts must be the same at a social optimum. At a common e¤ort level z:
@W
@z
= N

0

f (Nz)
N

f 0 (Nz)
N
N   C 0(z)

; (13)
@2W
@z2
= N
 
00

f (Nz)
N

f 0 (Nz)
N
2
N2 + 0

f (Nz)
N

f 00 (Nz)
N
N2   C 00(z)
!
< 0: (14)
Any social optimum must have ew > e as at z = e; @W@z > 0: A unique optimum must exist where
ew = C 0 1

0

f(New)
N

f 0(New)
N N

; as W is strictly concave in z and @W@z < 0 for high enough z
given C 0 is unbounded above.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider agent is incentive to deviate from a common e¤ort level
z > 0. We show that for any z su¢ ciently close to the no-desert equilibrium e¤ort e > 0, the
reduction in i0s desert utility D(4i) arising from such a deviation outweighs any gain in standard
utility U i; so ei = z is a best response to z i; that is to the vector of otherse¤orts e i in which
ej = z 8j 6= i.
From Assumption 1(i) and 0 > 0, 4i T 0 , yi T ri , ei S z: Thus ei = z ) D(4i) =
D(0) = 0; while a deviation upward to ei > z ) D(4i) < 0 as L(4i) < 0 for 4i < 0; and a
deviation downward to ei < z ) D(4i) < 0 as G(4i) < 0 for 4i > 0 by the assumption of global
desert guilt. Thus any deviation strictly reduces D; so deviations must increase U i su¢ ciently to
compensate.
(a) First consider z 2 (0; e] : From the proof of Proposition 1, U 00i < 0 with U 0i < 0 for ei
su¢ ciently high, and U
0
i(z; z i)  0 given z  e. Thus downward deviations strictly reduce U i; while
the strict concavity of U i in ei and its continuity in z ensures that large enough upward deviations
must always reduce U i; i.e., 9be > e such that 8z  e; U i (ei; z i)  U i (z; z i)) ei 2 [z; be] : As all
deviations strictly reduce D; we can therefore restrict attention to deviations with ei 2 (z; be] :
Now take a given z 2 (0; e] : The gain in U i from deviating to a specic ei 2 (z; be] is bounded
above by U
0
i(z; z i) (ei   z) given U 00i < 0: The desert loss from a deviation to the specic ei 2 (z; be] ;
D(4i) < 0; is bounded above by

supei2(z;be] D(4i)ei z

(ei   z). If D(4i)ei z has a maximal value m(z)
over ei 2 (z; be] ; then supei2(z;be] D(4i)ei z = m(z) < 0. If not, supei2(z;be] D(4i)ei z = limei#z D(4i)ei z : Applying
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LHôpitals Rule, and using Assumption 1 and L0 (0) > 0:
lim
ei#z
D(4i)
ei   z = limei#zD
0



f
N

   (ri)

0

f
N

f 0
N
  0 (ri) r0i

(15)
= L0 (0)

0

f(Nz)
N

f 0(Nz)
N
  r0i (z; z i)

< 0: (16)
Thus, as a su¢ cient condition, deviation to any ei 2 (z; be] strictly reduces Ui if U 0i(z; z i) <
  supei2(z;be] D(4i)ei z : From the proof of Proposition 1, U 0i(e; e i) = 0; and therefore by continuity
limz"eU 0i(z; z i) = 0: By continuity, limz"e  supei2(z;be] D(4i)ei z  =   supei2(e;be] D(4i)ei e . In turn, we
can see that   supei2(e;be] D(4i)ei e > 0; as the sup either equals m(e) < 0 if such a maximal value
exists, or L0 (0)

0

f(Ne)
N

f 0(Ne)
N   r0i (e; e i) < 0: Thus for z su¢ ciently close to e; and for
z = e; all deviations strictly reduce Ui so we have a (strict) equilibrium.
(b) When considering z > e; a similar argument to (a) holds, inverting the directions of de-
viations. U
0
i(z; z i) < 0 given z > e: As U 00i < 0; we need only consider downward deviations,
which in this case have a natural bound at 0: The su¢ cient no-deviation condition in this case is
 U 0i(z; z i) <   supei2[0;z) D(4i)z ei ; and limei"z
D(4i)
z ei =  G0 (0)0

f(Nz)
N

f 0(Nz)
N   r0i (z; z i)

< 0
using Assumption 1 and G0 (0) < 0 from global desert guilt.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose we have a common e¤ort level z  e: From the proof
of Proposition 1, U
0
i(z; z i)  0 given z  e. Applying LHôpitals Rule and using Assumption 1
together with G0 (0) > 0 from local desert elation:
lim
ei"z
D(4i)  0
ei   z = limei"zD
0



f
N

   (ri)

0

f
N

f 0
N
  0 (ri) r0i

(17)
= G0 (0)

0

f(Nz)
N

f 0(Nz)
N
  r0i (z; z i)

< 0: (18)
Thus local downward deviations strictly increase Ui; so we cannot have an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note rst that if the agents exhibit global desert guilt (Denition
1), desert utility D (4i)  0 at any vector of e¤orts. Note second that when the agents all exert a
common e¤ort level z > 0; D (4i) = 0: from Assumption 1 each agents deserved reference point
matches the equal share of team output that she receives, so 4i = 0. Part (i) then follows as when
all agents exert the socially optimal level of e¤ort in the absence of desert, given by ew > 0 from
Proposition 1, the sum of standard utilities
PN
i=1 U i is maximized and D (4i) = 0, soW =
PN
i=1 Ui
is maximized also.
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Next note that, from (14), welfare in the absence of desert is strictly concave in a common e¤ort
level z around ew: When considering z > 0 in a symmetric desert equilibrium, D (4i) = 0 from
above, so welfare with desert preference matches welfare without desert. With global desert guilt
and z = 0; D (4i)  0; so welfare with desert is weakly lower than without desert. Thus parts (ii)
and (iii) follow immediately from this concavity (remembering from Proposition 3 that local desert
elation always reduces e¤ort in a symmetric equilibrium).
Proof of Proposition 7.
(i) Follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the expressions for e and ew in its proof.
(ii) Let s i 
P
j 6=i ej
N 1 : If agent i sets ei > s i; then yi =
ei+(N 1)s i
N < ei = ri so the agent
su¤ers a desert loss and Ui =
ei+(N 1)s i
N + l

ei+(N 1)s i
N   ei

  ce2i2 : If ei < s i; then yi > ei = ri
and the agent feels desert elation or guilt with Ui =
ei+(N 1)s i
N + g

ei+(N 1)s i
N   ei

  ce2i2 : If
ei = s i; yi = ei = ri so Ui =
ei+(N 1)s i
N  
ce2i
2 :
At ei = s i; the right-hand side derivative

@Ui
@ei
+
= 1N  l
 
N 1
N
 cei  0, 1cN  l  N 1cN   ei:
At ei = s i; the left-hand side derivative

@Ui
@ei
 
= 1N   g
 
N 1
N
  cei  0, 1cN   g  N 1cN   ei:
Furthermore, Ui is everywhere strictly concave. Remembering that ei  0 and that l > g from our
assumption of loss aversion, it follows that any e 2  1cN   l  N 1cN  ; max 1cN   g  N 1cN  ; 0	\R+
forms a symmetric desert equilibrium and that there can be no other symmetric desert equilibria.
Suppose now that an asymmetric desert equilibrium exists. Let emaxi represent the highest
equilibrium e¤ort. Then emaxi > s i and e
max
i > 0; so e
max
i =
1
cN   l
 
N 1
cN

> 0 given Ui is
everywhere strictly concave. Similarly, emini < s i; so e
min
i = max

1
cN   g
 
N 1
cN

; 0
	
: But this
gives a contradiction given l > g and emaxi > e
min
i ; so there can be no asymmetric desert equilibria.
(iii) Follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii) given l > 0 and g < 0:
(iv) Follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii) given l > g > 0:
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